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RECEIVED MAY 16 2002 DISTRICT COURT CLERK

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IN THE NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF DOUGLAS

JUDY LU SHALLENBERGER, Trustee the Judy Lu Shallenberger Trust, dated February 29, 1984,

> Plaintiff/ Counterdefendant,

vs.

ORDER RE: PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT

RUSKA BOGDANOVICH; BOGDANOVICH and DOES I-X,

> Defendants/ Counterclaimants,

AND RELATED COUNTERCLAIMS

AND RELATED THIRD PARTY ACTION

THIS MATTER came on before the Court on the 1st day of May, 2002, on the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment ("Motion") filed by Plaintiff, JUDY LU SHALLENBERGER, Trustee of the Judy Lu Shallenberger Trust dated February 29, 1984 ("Plaintiff" or "SHALLENBERGER"). Motion was filed April 4, 2002.

> 0542655 BK 0502 PG 06092

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Rowe & Hales Attorneys At Law Present in Court on May 1, 2002, were the Plaintiff, together with her counsel, MICHAEL SMILEY ROWE, ESQ. of ROWE & HALES, LLP; Defendant MICHAEL BOGDANOVICH ("Defendant" or "BOGDANOVICH"), together with his counsel JEFFREY K. RAHBECK, ESQ.; and JAMES W. PUZEY, ESQ. of ALLISON, MACKENZIE, HARTMAN, SOUMBENIOTIS & RUSSELL, LTD., counsel of record for ROCK ISLAND CORPORATION, a Nevada corporation, Third Party Defendant ("Third Party Defendant" or "ROCK ISLAND").

Subsequent to the filing of the Motion, ROCK ISLAND filed its joinder to Plaintiff/Counterdefendant's Motion on April 12, 2002.

Subsequent to the Motion and the Joinder, Defendant retained counsel. After a conference call with the Court, the time within which to respond to the Motion, and for Plaintiff to thereafter file a reply, was extended. On April 25, 2002, Defendant filed his Opposition to Motion to Dismiss. On April 26, 2002, an Errata to the Opposition to the Motion was filed by the Defendant. Plaintiff replied to the Defendant's Opposition to the Motion on April 30, 2002.

The Court set a hearing for oral arguments on the Motion for May 1, 2002. At the time of the arguments, all counsel agreed that the Court could, and should, consider all of the Exhibits which were previously introduced into evidence at the time of the hearing on Plaintiff's request for a preliminary injunction. The Court has considered all of the Exhibits heretofore introduced into evidence.

During the telephonic conference wherein the Court established a time for oral arguments on the Motion, counsel for Plaintiff orally moved the Court for its order exonerating the \$50,000.00 bond which Plaintiff has placed with the Court as a requirement of the Court's preliminary injunction. Plaintiff's counsel renewed Plaintiff's request for exoneration of the \$50,000.00 bond at the time of the oral

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arguments conducted on May 1, 2002. During the hearing on May 1, 2002, Defendant's counsel advised the Court that Defendant did not object to the exoneration of Plaintiff's bond. Counsel for ROCK ISLAND also stipulated to the exoneration of Plaintiff's bond.

Based upon the entirety of the pleadings filed in this case, and the oral arguments of counsel on May 1, 2002, the Court deems itself well advised in the premises. The Court has specifically focused upon, and carefully considered, all of the points made by counsel in the pleadings filed relating to the Motion, and the Court has carefully considered the Motion, the Opposition to the Motion, the Joinder to the Motion, and the Reply of Plaintiff to the Opposition of the Defendant. The Court does not intend in this Order to delineate all of the points it has considered which are stated in the pleadings. Restated, the Court does not wish it to appear that the contents of this Order are the only matters considered by the Court. All of the parties' points and authorities were given thorough and deliberate consideration by the Court prior to its determination.

After such consideration, the Court will incorporate by this reference all of the other written arguments and points submitted by Plaintiff in the Trust's Motion and Reply to Opposition, together with Plaintiff's oral arguments, as the findings and authorities relied upon by the Court. The Court cannot isolate any particular point made by the Plaintiff with which it disagrees, and they all are in accord with the Court's consideration of the Motion.

After careful consideration of the Defendant's Opposition and the oral arguments made by counsel for the Defendant, the Court disagrees with the position taken by the Defendant, but observes that it was well presented and argued.

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Physical Address 638 Esmeralda Street Minden, NV 89423 (775) 782-8141 FINDINGS OF FACT

1. Because this matter is set for a jury's consideration, the Court deems that the Motion has a profound affect on the case, and determines that resolution of the Motion may be the most important issue in the case.

- 2. The Court finds that the easement described and depicted by the evidence in this case, specifically the Parcel Map for Rose Bogdanovich filed for record on February 8, 1989 ("Parcel Map") (the Court's Exhibit "1"), and the Maintenance Agreement entered into by the Plaintiff and the Defendant on May 31, 1989 ("Maintenance Agreement") (the Court's Exhibit "16") are clear and unambiguous. Both the Parcel Map and the Maintenance Agreement were recorded in 1989; the Maintenance Agreement recorded concurrently with Plaintiff's close of escrow wherein the Trust purchased Parcel 6A as depicted on the Parcel Map. The Maintenance Agreement incorporates by reference the Parcel Map.
- 3. The Court finds that the easement as depicted on the Parcel Map, and as specifically defined in the Maintenance Agreement, is very specific as to its width and its length. Accordingly, the Court finds there is no question as to exactly what the parameters were and are of this particular roadway easement.
- 4. The Court finds that the evidence is unequivocal that the intention of the Defendant at the time of the Parcel Map, and the intention of the Plaintiff and the Defendant at the time of the Maintenance Agreement, was to dedicate the easement between Parcels 6A and 6B solely for the use of those two properties, and those two properties alone. There is no factual dispute about what occurred in 1989.

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the affidavit of the Defendant, the Court struggled with the issue of the effect of granting partial summary judgment to be sure that the Defendant would not be denied his right to trial by jury on this However, even the Defendant's affidavit does not raise a issue. factual issue relating to his intention in 1989. The affidavit references the Defendant's subjective intention, but the Defendant does not say either in his affidavit or in his deposition testimony Plaintiff's affidavit makes that the Plaintiff ever agreed with him. that the Trustee of the Trust never agreed with BOGDANOVICH's thoughts. Accordingly, his subjective thoughts are not relevant to determination of the Motion. For some unarticulated reason, the Defendant believed he could be extending the easement later on if he determined it was necessary, but the Court finds that he assumed the risk that he would not be able to extend the easement The Court finds that the Defendant did not extend the easement at the time in question, 1989, when he should have extended it if this easement was to be extended.

In reviewing the Motion and related pleadings, including

6. The Court agrees with Plaintiff's assertion, and so finds, that the relevant time period in which the Court must focus is 1989, and not some event that occurred at a later time. At the time of the Maintenance Agreement, it is unequivocal and without any doubt whatsoever that the intention of the parties was to have the "30' private access and public utility easement" designated on the Parcel Map, and as constrained by the Maintenance Agreement, to be located exactly where it is and for purposes stated in the Maintenance Agreement; that is to say, the 30' private access roadway and public ///

utility easement is, for access purposes, solely for the use of Parcels 6A and 6B as depicted on the Parcel Map.

7. The Court finds that the failure of either the Parcel Map or the Maintenance Agreement to use the word "exclusive" as a descriptor of the easement is not pivotal. While the easement was not described as an exclusive easement, the Parcel Map, the Maintenance Agreement, and all of the acts of the Plaintiff and the Defendant are consistent with the finding that the roadway is an exclusive easement. It is to be used exclusively by the owners of Parcels 6A and 6B.

The Defendant has asserted that paragraph 4 of the Maintenance Agreement dictates a contrary result.

Paragraph 4 of the Maintenance Agreement states:

"This agreement and the benefits and burdens thereof shall inure to the grantees, successors, heirs, assigns and representatives of each party."

The Court interprets paragraph 4 of the Maintenance Agreement to state that whatever rights to use the 30' private access and public utility easement the Defendant reserved could be assigned to a successor in title to one of the two parcels, Parcel 6A or 6B. Paragraph 4 does not allow him to expand, without Plaintiff's consent, any of the rights to use the easement, nor could Defendant expand the easement itself.

8. With regard to the Defendant's equitable arguments that an easement should be implied by the Court, the Court denies the Motion insofar as it might be interpreted to request summary judgment as to other forms of easement. There are certain factual issues to be resolved by the trier of fact as to other forms of easement. The Defendant has raised enough questions of fact, for the purpose of defeating a Motion for summary judgment, on a claim of an equitable

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easement to submit those factual questions to the trier of fact. The Court cannot rule, solely as a matter of law and strictly in the context of summary judgment, that the Defendant does not have a right to use some form of easement arising in equity, such as an easement by necessity or prescriptive easement.

The Court does not rule, for example, on the question of whether or not the Defendant could claim, or that the Court could grant, some other separate easement that did not affect the 30' private access and public utility easement.

9. The Court finds that the Defendant cannot expand the scope of the roadway within the 30' private access and public utility easement by additional use, or by expansion of the easement's use as access for another parcel, or by expansion of its length or width.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

The summary judgment 1. Court concludes that on the interpretation to be given the Parcel Map and the Maintenance Agreement, and the resulting 30' private access and public utility easement, is appropriate. The Court is mindful that summary judgment is only appropriate when, after review of the record in a light most favorable to the non-moving party, there remain no issues of material In determining whether summary judgment is proper, the nonmoving party is entitled to have all of the evidence and all reasonable inferences accepted as true. Restated, summary judgment is appropriate when, after a review of the record viewed in a light most favorable to the non-moving party, there remain no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter See, e.g., Clark County School Dist. v. Riley, 116 Nev. 1143, of law. ///

14 P.3d 22; Coury v. Robison, 115 Nev. 84, 976 P.2d 518 (1999); Allyn v. MacDonald, 112 Nev. 68, 71, 910 P.2d 263 (1996);

2. The Court concludes, however, that summary judgment is appropriate in certain circumstances such as exist in this case. Particularly this is the case when the Court is called upon to review written instruments that are clear and unambiguous, and are susceptible to only one interpretation. In contract matters, such as the Maintenance Agreement which incorporates the Parcel Map, summary judgment is proper if there are no ambiguities in the instrument. University of Nevada, Reno v. Stacey, 116 Nev. 428, 997 P.2d, 812 (2000); Chwialkowski v. Sachs, 108 Nev. 404, 406, 834 P.2d 405, 406 (1992).

Where instruments are to be interpreted by the Court, such as contracts, or as in this case the Maintenance Agreement and Parcel Map, the Court is under an obligation to construe the instruments so as to avoid rendering the contract meaningless or portions of it superfluous. *Musser v. Bank of America*, 114 Nev. 945, 964 P.2d 51 (1998).

3. The Court concludes that there is no ambiguity in the language appearing on the Parcel Map in its depiction of this roadway, to wit: "30' private access and public utility easement". Furthermore, the Maintenance Agreement is likewise unambiguous in its language. The Maintenance Agreement provides at page 2, paragraph 1 that both the Plaintiff and the Defendant "shall have equal rights and obligations regarding the 30' private access and public utility easement set forth on the Parcel Map and agree to share equally all costs and expenses thereof". Another example is paragraph 3 of the Maintenance Agreement which provides:

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"The funds contributed and accumulated by the parties be used for the maintenance, repair replacement of the road and bridge currently existing. Maintenance shall be undertaken yearly to maintain the bridge in existing condition. its Expenditures of funds for other than such annual maintenance and repair shall require the joint agreement of the parties."

Alteration of the roadway or expansion of its length, width and use cannot be valid unless Plaintiff's consent is first received, which, in this case, it clearly was not.

4. The Court concludes that the basic rules for determining the extent of an easement created by deeds, or other recorded instruments such as the Parcel Map and Maintenance Agreement, are set forth in Cox v. Glenbrook Co., 78 Nev. 254, 371 P.2d 647 (1962). The general rule is that the extent of an easement created by conveyance is fixed by the conveyance. Id, at 262. Extrinsic evidence is not admissible for the purposes, of determining clear and unambiguous terms. Id.

Furthermore, the conveying instrument must be construed in light of the facts and circumstances existing at its date and affecting the property, the intention of the parties being the object of the inquiry. Cox, at 264.

5. As found hereinabove, and as concluded by the Court, there is no question as to the intention of this easement and the parcels benefitted by it. The Court has examined the affidavits of David Winchell, the surveyor of the easement in question, and Daniel Jenkins, the Defendant's planning consultant and environmental planner who assisted the Defendant in the creation of the Parcel Map, to ascertain that the intention of the Defendant at the time of the recordation of the Parcel Map was to create a private road solely for

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the owners of Parcels 6A and 6B as depicted on the Parcel Map. As stated in the Jenkins' affidavit, and despite Jenkins' recommendation to the Defendant that he should depict the road completely traversing Lot 6 of the Willow Bend Subdivision, the Defendant chose not to do so. Jenkins' recommendation regarding the length of the roadway and purposes for its use appear to be very similar to that which the Defendant belatedly attempted in 1994 by the "Grant of Easement of Way" and the "Supplement to Maintenance Agreement" (Exhibits 18 and 19, respectively).

- 6. The Court concludes that the subsequent "Grant of Easement of Way" executed by the Defendant on September 13, 1994, and the "Supplement to Maintenance Agreement" also executed on September 13, 1994, by the Defendant are void ab initio, and shall be expunged from the official records of Douglas County, Nevada by recordation of a certified copy of this order.
- 7. The Court concludes that should any of the above-stated conclusions of law be interpreted as a finding of fact, it is so intended by the Court. Similarly, should any of the findings of fact be construed as a conclusion of law, the Court intends such construction.

ORDER AND JUDGMENT

1. It is the order and judgment of this Court that the 1989 Parcel Map and Maintenance Agreement create a private access roadway solely for the use and benefit of the owners of Parcels 6A and 6B of the Parcel Map for Rose Bogdanovich. The roadway shall be governed in its maintenance and use as provided by the 1989 Parcel Map and Maintenance Agreement. In this respect, the Motion is granted.

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2. It is the order and judgment of the Court that the 1994 "Grant of Easement of Way", recorded as Document No. 347145 and referenced as Book 0994, Pg. 4898, Official Records of Douglas County, Nevada Recorder, and the 1994 "Supplement to Maintenance Agreement", recorded as Document 347145, Book 0994, Pg. 4894 are void, and they shall have no force and effect. By recordation of a certified copy of this Order, the Court determines that the Grant of Easement of Way and Supplement to Maintenance Agreement shall be expunged from the official records of the Douglas County, Nevada Recorder.

- 3. The Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is denied as to any other type of easement that does not affect the easement depicted in the Parcel Map and Maintenance Agreement as there remain questions of fact about whether there is a right to an equitable easement such as an easement by necessity or prescriptive easement.
- 4. It is the order of the Court that the \$50,000.00 bond posted with the Clerk of this Court by the Plaintiff as security for the issuance of the preliminary injunction shall be, and is hereby, exonerated and discharged. The Clerk of the Court shall take such steps as are necessary to release the bond posted by Plaintiff.
- 5. The parties shall continue to be bound by the terms and provisions of this Court's preliminary injunction, except as modified herein, until further order of this Court.
- 6. The Court rules that there is no just reason for delay, and directs entry of Judgment in favor of Plaintiff Judy Lu Shallenberger, and Counter-Claimant Rock Island Corporation, and against Defendants and Counter-Defendants Michael Bogdanovich and Ruza Bogdanovich, and all claims or defenses dealing with the exclusivity or non-exclusivity of the easement in question.

	1	7, The Court further certifies this Partial Summary Judgment
	2	as final, pursuant to the provisions of NRCP 54(b).
	3	DATED this \mathcal{L}_{φ} day of May, 2002.
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3	5	MICHAEL P. GIBBONS DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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