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DOUGLAS COUNTY DISTRICT COURT CLEEN

IN THE NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF DOUGLAS

WFS FINANCIAL, INC., a California corporation, fka WESTERN FINANCIAL SAVINGS BANK, F.S.B.,

Plaintiff

vs.

ORDER AND JUDGMENT

ROGER W. HOLCOMBE and DOES I through V,

Defendants.

Plaintiff, WFS Financial, Inc.(WFS) moves for summary judgment in the above-entitled action pursuant to NRCP 56 and requests that the Court find Defendant, Roger W. Holcombe, in breach of the contract that gives rise to this action and that the Plaintiff be entitled to a deficiency judgment as a matter Defendant moves for judgment in his favor as a matter of law in that there remain no issues of material fact.

Mr. Holcombe purchased a used 1994 Ford Explorer from Capital Ford in Carson City, Nevada. On October 12, 1996, he executed a Vehicle Retail Installment Contract requiring 60 Monthly payments of \$475.56, which contract was assigned to WFS claims that Mr. Holcombe fell into arrears in making WFS.

MICHAEL P. GIBBONS DISTRICT JUDGE DOUGLAS COUNTY P.O. BOX 218 MINDEN, NV 89423

payments in that all payments did not meet the specified amount under the contract and some payments, viz. October 1999,

December 1999, January 2000, February 2000, and March 2000,

were not paid in their entirety. Consequently, Mr. Holcombe's

Ford Explorer automobile was delivered into the possession of

WFS by order of the Court and sold at auction for \$6,900.00.

The resultant deficiency of \$3,169.25 is claimed by WFS

pursuant to the terms of the aforementioned conditional sales

contract. The contract also provides for the payment of

interest on the deficiency amount at the rate of 15.88% per

annum along with attorney's fees and costs.

Mr. Holcombe has counterclaimed, alleging that he was current in his payments—despite the fact that some payments were less than agreed to in the retail installment contract—until he received notice of WFS's impending repossession of his vehicle. Mr. Holcombe maintains that he had a legitimate concern over how his overpayments were being credited to his account, for WFS had agreed to apply overpayments to the principal and not to the interest. Nevertheless, WFS continued to apply overpayments to the interest which would be adjusted upon payment of the final installment in conformity with the written contract. In response to Mr. Holcombe's attachment to his affidavit, exhibit A, which is a letter from WFS informing him that he has fallen behind in his payments in the amount of \$946.66, he adduces exhibit B, which appears to be correspondence from Mr. Holcombe's wife directing that such

overpayments be applied to future principal payments. This correspondence notwithstanding, there is no evidence that WFS agreed orally or in writing to such an arrangement. Ultimately, Mr. Holcombe was apprized that his vehicle would be repossessed. It is his contention that such notice constituted an anticipatory breach of contract. Furthermore, he posits that said repossession was a breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing which now entitles him to unspecified damages.

In weighing Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, the Court must review the record in a light most favorable to the non-moving party, i.e., the Defendant. In so doing, there must remain no material facts in dispute. That is, the non-moving party is entitled to have its evidence and reasonable inferences accepted as true. Wiltsie v. Baby Grand Corp., 105 Nev. 291 (1989). NJDCR 7 requires that factual contentions involved in any pretrial or post trial motion be "initially presented and heard upon affidavits, depositions, [or] answers to interrogatories."

The Court accepts as true for purposes of this motion, therefore, that on October 12, 1996, defendant entered into a Vehicle Retail Installment Contract and Security Agreement for the purchase of a 1994 Ford Explorer, the terms of which required him to make 60 monthly payments in the amount of \$475.56 due on the 12th of each month beginning on November 12, 1996. The total amount financed was \$19,605.42. This

MICHAEL P. GIBBONS
DISTRICT JUDGE
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installment contract was assigned to WFS Financial. Prior to August 13, 1999, Mr. Holcombe exceeded the \$475.56 monthly amount on occasion; on other occasions he tendered less than the aforesaid amount. On August 13, 1999, WFS corresponded with Mr. Holcombe in order to inform him that he had fallen into arrears in making his monthly payments in accordance with the retail installment contract. Shortly afterwards, his wife responded, insisting that they were not behind in their payments. Mr. Holcombe believed that WFS had agreed to apply overpayments to the principal: he accompanied his first payment with a memo requesting that anything paid over the contract amount be applied to reduce the principal. He believed this to be true because someone at Capital Ford allegedly said it would not be a problem. See, Affidavit of Roger Holcombe.

Unfortunately, there is no evidence that WFS ever agreed to this modification. The retail installment contract clearly provides that "...early payments will have the effect of reducing your final payment..." WFS served Mr. Holcombe notice that he was in default and afforded him the opportunity to make good on his delinquent account. Instead, Mr. Holcombe erroneously assumed that WFS was itself in breach of the contract by merely threatening to repossess its collateral. Subsequently, WFS exercised its right under the retail installment contract to take possession of the Ford Explorer.

In Kahle v. Kostiner, 85 Nev. 355 (1985), the Supreme Court of Nevada clarified what constitutes anticipatory breach:

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Seller argues that the jury should have been instructed that an anticipatory repudiation must be to the whole contract and the seller's refusal to pave the streets was only a partial breach. The instruction given provided: "You are instructed that to find an anticipatory repudiation of a contract the party so charged must have demonstrated a definite unequivocal and absolute intent not to perform a substantial portion of the contract. To justify the adverse party in treating the repudiation as an anticipatory breach the refusal to perform must be an unqualified repudiation of a substantial portion of the contract."

The instruction was proper. We affirm the doctrine that anticipatory repudiation applies when a substantial portion of the contract is repudiated.

Id. at 358. In delivering notice to Mr. Holcombe that he was in default and needed to make up his delinquent payments or suffer the repossession of his vehicle, WFS did not convey an unequivocal and absolute intent not to perform a substantial portion of the contract. On the contrary, WFS was adhering to the contract by exercising its rights therein. WFS had already lent the money necessary to purchase the vehicle to Mr. Holcombe. It was Mr. Holcombe's obligation under the contract to tender timely payments in the amount of \$475.56 per month. , WFS was merely attempting to collect the money owed under the contract or recover its security interest in the loan, once Mr. Holcombe failed to live up to his part of the bargain. Holcombe has cited no authority to the contrary. Therefore, good cause appearing,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that summary judgment be entered in favor of the Plaintiff, WFS, and against the Defendant, Roger Holcombe. Defendant was in breach of the contract at the time

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Plaintiff repossessed the collateral at issue. Accordingly,

JUDGMENT IS HEREBY ENTERED in favor of the Plaintiff and against the Defendant for the deficiency due under the contract in the amount of \$3,169.25 as of March 28, 2000. The court will entertain further evidence on the reasonable value of the automobile and the amounts owed the Plaintiff, should the Defendant establish a need for a hearing.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff is entitled to an award of attorney's fees and costs pursuant to the terms of the Plaintiff shall file a memorandum of costs and contract. disbursement pursuant to NRS 18.020 and an application for fees pursuant to NRS_18.010.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the entire judgment shall accrue interest at the contract rate of 15.88 percent per annum until paid.

The Counterclaim is dismissed because it was contingent upon proof of Plaintiff's breach of contract.

DATED this / (/ day of September, 2001.

MICHAEL P. GIBBONS


DISTRICT JUDGE

Copies served by mail this 20 day of September, 2001; Robert C. Herman, Esq., 301 West Fourth Street, Carson City, NV 89703; Jeffrey A. Dickerson, Esq., 10100 Old Virginia Road, Reno, NV 89511.

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The document to which this certificate is attached is a full, true and correct copy of the original on file and of

DATE: State of Nagada in and for the County of Douglas,

IN OFFICIAL RECORDS OF DOUGLAS CO.. NEVADA

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LINDA SLATER RECORDER