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Case # <u>09-CV-0285</u>

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ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT IN ITS ENTIRETY

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Case No. 09-CV-0285

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IN THE NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF DOUGLAS

SCHULZ PARTNERS, LLC,

Plaintiff,

vs.

ZEPHYR COVE PROPERTY OWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., a Nevada corporation,

Defendant.

ORDER DISMISSING
COMPLAINT IN ITS ENTIRETY

THIS MATTER comes before the court upon Plaintiff Schulz Partners LLC's ("Schulz") Motion for Preliminary Injunction, filed September 10, 2009, and Defendant Zephyr Cove Property Owners Association, Inc.'s ("Association") Motion to Dismiss, filed September 21, 2009. Both motions have been fully briefed. This court has read and reviewed all the documents, pleadings and exhibits offered in support of and in opposition to the motions. Further, this court takes judicial notice of Schulz et al. v. Zephyr Cove Property Owners Association, Inc., Ninth Judicial District case no. 15446, which was originally filed December 31, 1984 ("the first case").

It is undisputed that Schulz owns Lot 3 of Zephyr Cove. Schulz moves for an injunction forcing the Association to remove two signs from the edges of a beach area abutting Lot 3 of Zephyr Cove. Schulz alleges that these signs slander their title because Schulz owns the beach area. The Association disagrees, however, and seeks to dismiss this entire case based upon the 1987 written decision of Judge Norman C. Robison in the first case. Everyone agrees that Schulz is the successor-in-interest to the plaintiffs in the first case.

Each party asserts that the other is barred from making certain arguments under claim and issue preclusion. This court must first examine these arguments to determine whether the motion to dismiss has merit, to determine whether the court should even address Schulz's motion for preliminary injunction.

I. Procedural History of the First Case

In the first case, the plaintiffs sought to quiet title from the Association as to the sandy beach area abutting Lot 3 down to the elevation of 6,223 feet which was Lake Tahoe datum. Complaint to Quiet Title (Dec. 31, 1984) (Case No. 15446). On January 27, 1987, the plaintiffs in the first case received a clerk's default against Zephyr Cove Properties, Inc., the developer. Default (Jan. 27, 1987) (Case No. 15446) (attached as Exhibit J to the complaint in 09-CV-0285). No default judgment was ever entered against the developer.

After a two day trial, the Honorable Norman C. Robison made the following findings of fact:

- 1. That Plaintiffs [Schulz et al] are the fee owners of that certain real property described as Lot 3 in Block F as shown on the Amended Map of Zephyr Cove Property in Section 10, Township 13 North, Range 18 East, M.D.B.&M., which was filed in the office of the recorder of Douglas County, Nevada on August 5, 1929.
- 3. That by virtue of Quitclaim Deed dated November 20, 1982, recorded on November 29, 1982, in Book 1182, Page 1266 as Document No. 73526 of the official records of Douglas County, Defendant [the Association] is the grantee of Zephyr Cove Property, Inc., [the developer] as to that certain real property described as:

"The beach area at Zephyr Cove in front of Lots 1-A through Lot 11, and to the low water mark as delineated on that certain map entitled, 'Amended Map of Zephyr Cove Property in Section 10, Township 13 North, Range 18 East' filed for record on August 5, 1929 in the office of the County Recorder of Douglas County, State of Nevada."

Said Quitclaim Deed was admitted Exhibit "A" to these proceedings.

4. That by covenants running with the land recorded by [the developer in the 1982 quitclaim deed] the aforementioned beach area was to remain continuously open for use by the property owners and/or residents of [the Association].

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 2-3 (May 29, 1987) (Case No. 15446) (attached as Exhibit 1 to the motion to dismiss in 09-CV-0285). Judge Robison went on to conclude:

- 1. That the conveyances to Plaintiffs [Schulz et al.] granted them no interest in fee to any real property other than the property within the platted boundaries of Lot 3 in Block F as shown on the Amended Map of Zephyr Cove Property in Section 10, Township 13 North, Range 18 East, M.D.B.&M. Which was filed in the office of the recorder of Douglas County, Nevada on August 5, 1929.
- 2. That that certain Grant, Bargain and Sale Deed dated June 4, 1979, recorded October 27, 1980, in Book 1080, Page 2061, as Document No. 50079 (Exhibit "13" to these proceedings), granted no interest in the fine

interest.

3. That Plaintiffs enjoy the same right to use the fine sandy beach area below the seawall as all other owners in the Zephyr Cove Subdivision. . .

sandy beach as to Plaintiffs or their predecessors-in-

- 5. That [the Association] is the grantee of [the developer] under that certain Quitclaim Deed dated November 26, 1982, which transferred the beach area at Zephyr Cove in front of Lots 1-A through Lot 11 and to the low-water mark, as delineated on that certain map entitled "Amended map of Zephyr Cove Property in Section 10, Township 13 North, Range 18 East", filed for record on August 5, 1929, in the office of the County Recorder of Douglas County, State of Nevada.
- 6. That Plaintiffs [Schulz et al.] have a prescriptive right to use that portion of land adjacent to Lot 3 in Block F lying between the platted boundaries of Lot 3 in Block F and the seawall.
- 9. That all owners of property within the area covered by the Amended Map of Zephyr Cove Property in Section 10, Township 13 North, Range 18 East, M.D.B.&M, which was filed in the office of the recorder of Douglas County, Nevada, on August 5, 1929, have an irrevocable license to use the fine sandy beach below the seawall.
- Id. at 4-6. Final judgment was entered against the plaintiffs in the first case on May 29, 1987. See Exhibit Q to complaint in 09-CV-0285.

The first case was appealed by the plaintiffs and their appeal was dismissed in its entirety; Judge Robison's decision was affirmed. Schulz v. Zephyr Cove Property Owners Association, Inc. (March 30, 1988) (Nevada Supreme Court docket no. 18344) (attached as Exhibit G to the complaint in 09-CV-0285).

II. Procedural History of this Case

In this current action, Schulz alleges four causes of action: (1) to extinguish the Association's claim to the beach

area adjacent to Lot 3; (2) declaratory relief determining the scope of Schulz's property rights; (3) an injunction excluding the Association from the beach adjacent to Lot 3 to the elevation of 6,223 feet; and (4) slander of title for the Association's posting of signs excluding plaintiffs from the beach area adjacent to Lot 3. Complaint at \$\ 20\$, 22, 24, 26 (August 20, 2009). Plaintiffs' claims are based on the conclusion that the Association does not have any ownership interest in the beach at Lot 3. Id. at \$\ 14\$. Plaintiffs' claims are based on the conclusion that they own the beach at Lot 3 to the elevation of 6,223 feet. Id. at \$\ 13\$. Each of these claims rests on the legal basis that plaintiffs are the owners of the sandy beach area adjacent to Lot 3.

III. Standard of Law - Motion to Dismiss

When considering a motion to dismiss made under NRCP 12(b)(5), a district court must construe the complaint liberally and draw every fair inference in favor of the plaintiff. Merluzzie v. Larson, 96 Nev 409, 411-12 (1980), overruled on other grounds, 106 Nev. 568 (1990). A complaint should not be dismissed unless it appears to a certainty that the plaintiff could prove no set of facts that would entitle him or her to relief. Zalk-Josephs Co. v. Wells Cargo, 81 Nev. 163, 169 (1965).

IV. Plaintiffs are Barred from Bringing this Action under Claim Preclusion

The Nevada Supreme Court recently modified the doctrine of res judicata - instead, the concept has been broken into "claim preclusion" and "issue preclusion." Five Star Capital Corp. v. Ruby, 124 Nev. Adv. Op. 88, ____, 194 P.3d 709, 714 (Oct. 30, 2008).

Claim preclusion applies to prevent one (or both) parties from bringing a claim that was previously, or could have been, brought in a prior civil law suit. *Id.* For claim preclusion to apply there must be: (1) the same parties, or privity between the parties; (2) a valid, final judgment; and (3) the second law suit is based on the same claims that were actually or could have been brought during the first case. 194 P. 3d at 717.

First, this case involves the same parties or their successors-in-interest as the first case. Obviously, the Association was the defendant in the first case and is again the defendant in this matter. Plaintiff Schulz Partners, LLC, is the successor-in-interest to the plaintiffs in the first case, as shown by plaintiff's own chain of title. Motion for Preliminary Injunction at Exhibit T.

Second, there was a valid, final judgment in the first case.

Judge Robison issued a final judgment after a two-day trial in

1987, which was later affirmed by the Nevada Supreme Court.

Third, this current lawsuit is based on the same claims that were actually brought in the first case. Each of the Schultz's

claims in this action is predicated on the same question as the first case: whether Schulz owned the beach area adjacent to Lot 3 down to the water line at Lake Tahoe.

The decision in the first case was explicitly clear: the Association owned the beach area adjacent to Lot 3 pursuant to the 1982 quitclaim deed. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at finding no. 2, and conclusion no. 5 (May 29, 1987) (Case No. 15446). Plaintiffs Schulz never had any interest in that beach area. Id. at conclusion nos. 2 and 3. Plaintiffs Schulz has the same right to use that beach as others in the development, which is that they have an irrevocable license to use the sandy beach from the seawall down to the water level. Id. at conclusion no. 3 and 9. Further, Plaintiffs Schulz have the prescriptive right to use the beach between the boundaries of Lot 3 and the seawall. Id. at conclusion no. 6.

Plaintiffs cannot reargue these findings, or the underlying facts affecting them, in this current case. Plaintiffs make a convoluted argument that the January 1986 default against the developer in some way gave plaintiffs title to the beach area. This argument, however, fails to recognize that a clerk's default is not an enforceable judgment. NRCP 55. Furthermore, the written decision of Judge Robison superseded any effect of the default, making it clear that Plaintiff Schulz never had any interest in the beach area. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at conclusion nos. 2 and 3 (May 29, 1987) (Case No. 15446).

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Accordingly, plaintiffs are prohibited by claim preclusion from re-litigating their non-ownership of the beach area adjacent to Lot 3.

V. Plaintiffs are Barred from Bringing this Action under Issue Preclusion

Issue preclusion applies to prevent a party from re-raising an issue that was "actually and necessarily litigated" and on which there was a final decision on the merits in the first lawsuit. 194 P.3d at 713. Issue preclusion may apply, even if claims preclusion does not. *Id*.

For issue preclusion to apply there must be: (1) the issue decided in the first case must be identical to the issue to be decided in the second case; (2) the first ruling must have been on the merits and become final; (3) the party against whom issue preclusion is asserted must have been a party to the first case; and (4) the issue was actually and necessarily litigated.

First, the issue decided in the first case by Judge Robison is identical to the issue to be decided in this case: do the Schulz's own the beach adjacent to Lot 3.

Second, Judge Robison found on the merits, after a trial, that plaintiff's predecessor did not have any ownership interest in the beach adjacent to Lot 3. That decision became final after the Nevada Supreme Court affirmed it in its entirety by dismissing Schulz's appeal.

Third, the plaintiff in this case is the direct successorin-interest to the parties in the first case. Indeed,

plaintiff's partners, Donald and Kathleen Schulz, were named plaintiffs in the first action.

Fourth, the issue of ownership of the beach area adjacent to Lot 3 was actually and necessary litigated in the first case. Indeed, Judge Robison's written decision deals solely with the issue of ownership and access or use of the beach areas — even though plaintiffs made other claims in their amended complaint (which appear to have been resolved by settlement).

In this matter, issue preclusion prevents the parties from re-litigating the issue of who owns and who may access or use the beach area adjacent to Lot 3. Judge Robison was clear: any owner within the Zephyr Cove development, including the Schulz's, may access the beach adjacent to Lot 3 between the water level and the sea wall. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at conclusion nos. 3 and 9 (May 29, 1987) (Case No. 15446). Although plaintiffs have a right to use the beach between the seawall and the boundary to Lot 3, the Association continues to be the fee simple owner of that property. Id. at conclusions 2, 5, and 6.

VI. Adverse Possession Has Not Been Pleaded

Accordingly, as of the court's decision in 1987, the Association owned the beach adjacent to Lot 3 in fee simple, but Schulz had access to use the beach like any other property owner within the subdivision. The Association believes that this resolves this matter and that it should be dismissed in its entirety, but Schulz argues that there is still an outstanding claim for adverse possession based on paragraph 12 to the First

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Amended Complaint which states:

Seawalls were built by the Plaintiff's predecessors and the owners of the other buildable lakefront lots, without objection from the developer, to stabilize the bank at the approximate high water elevation. One of Plaintiff's predecessors constructed a fence on top of the seawall to prevent intrusion. The seawall and fence has been maintained by Plaintiff predecessors continuously for more than fifty years. The area between the metes and bounds description of the northwestern lot line of Lot 3 and the seawall has been acquired by adverse possession, or in the alternative, the boundary has been established by the doctrine of settled boundaries. The [Association] asserts an unsupportable adverse claim to the area behind the Plaintiff's sea wall.

Because of the application of claim and issue preclusion, plaintiff is barred from attempting to assert an adverse possession claim prior to the court's decision in the first case in 1987. Accordingly, the plaintiffs must assert adverse possession since the date of the decision in the last order.

To assert a claim for adverse possession, plaintiffs must plead by a verified complaint: (1) actual, exclusive and adverse possession for 15 years; and (2) that he paid taxes on that property for 5 years. NRS 40.090(1). Nevada is a notice pleading state, but the pleading must assert sufficient facts necessary to establish all the elements of a claim so that the opposing party has adequate notice of the nature of the claim and relief sought. NRCP 8; Hay v. Hay, 100 Nev. 196 (1984).

Paragraph 12 of the First Amended Complaint is too vague to put any reasonable person on notice that plaintiffs are seeking title through adverse possession. Not only is the complaint not verified, but there are no allegations tending to show that

plaintiff has exclusively possessed the area between the Lot 3 and the seawall in light of the court's previous grant of a prescriptive easement, or that plaintiff has paid taxes with regard to this property for the last 5 years.

Accordingly, the complaint on file is insufficient to make out a claim of adverse possession.

VII. Conclusion

Accordingly, defendant's Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED IN ITS ENTIRETY. Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction is DENIED as moot. The court notes, under Honeycutt, that it would likely have denied the plaintiff's motion anyway on the grounds that they were not likely to succeed on the merits, and that any harm to the plaintiff was de minimis. The complaint is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE (except for a claim for adverse possession if an amended complaint is filed).

Defendant moves for attorney's fees and costs pursuant to NRCP 11. There may be merit to the request. The defendant is authorized to file a separate motion for fees and costs citing all relevant legal doctrines, and include a memorandum of costs and an affidavit of fees.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated this 10 day of November, 2009.

DISTRICT JUDGE

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Copies served this day of November, 2009, to: Harry W. Swainston, Esq., 4040 Hobart Road, Carson City, NV 89703; Todd A. Bader, Esq., 232 Court Street, Reno, NV 89501,2220.

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