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-OR-		
I the undersigned hereby affirm the attached document, incl for recording does NOT contain the personal information of	uding any exhibits, her any person(s). (Per NRS	eby submitted 239B.030)
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DOUGLAS COUNTY, NV

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1	Case No. 2021-CV-00146
2	Dept. No. 2 RECEIVED 2014 APR -8 PM 2: 47
3	APR 0 8 2024 EUGGBIER. WILLIAMS
4	Douglas County BYAWEIDNEREPUTY
5	Ditante ou a
6	IN THE NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA
7	IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF DOUGLAS
8	
9	CHARLES LANDINO,
10	Petitioner/Counter Respondent,
11	FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND JUDGMENT
12	ERIN CAMBRA,
13	Respondent/Counter Petitioner.
14	
15	THIS MATTER came before the Court for trial on April 3-4,
16	2024. Petitioner/Counter Respondent Charles Landino ("Charles")
17	appeared with counsel, Neal C. Falk, Esq. Respondent/Counter
18	Petitioner Erin Cambra ("Erin") appeared with counsel, Jennifer S.
19	Anderson, Esq. At issue is Erin's claim for partition of real
20	property pursuant to NRS Chapter 39 and Charles' claim for
21	conversion of personal property. Good cause appearing, the Court
22	finds and orders as follows:
23	Findings of Fact
24	Erin and Charles began dating in 2013. Erin was a nanny for
25	two children. Charles was a pipe welder and cattle rancher.
26	Charles owned a home in Gardnerville, Nevada and leased property
27	for his cattle operation.
	In 2014, Erin and her child from a prior relationship moved

into Charles' home.

Charles proposed marriage to Erin in December 2014. A diamond ring followed in October 2015. The two began planning for their future.

In April 2016, Charles and Erin together purchased real property located at 23 Hawk View Drive, Wellington, Nevada ("Ranch"), taking title as "Charles Landino, an unmarried man and Erin Cambra, an unmarried woman, as joint tenants." The Ranch is approximately 26-acres and came with water rights, a residence, an alfalfa field and livestock pens.

Erin discovered she was pregnant approximately two weeks after the parties put in the offer on the Ranch. Due to the move, the pregnancy and Charles' out of town work, Erin quit being a nanny to take care of the children and the Ranch. It is undisputed that Erin took care of the children, including home schooling, and the home. The extent of Erin's contributions to the livestock and the alfalfa field is disputed.

Within one month of purchasing the Ranch, Charles added Erin to three bank accounts ("Joint Accounts") designated as "Joint with Right of Survivorship (Not as tenants in common or community property)." Charles testified this was done out of a sense of duty due to Erin's pregnancy and the fact that he was working out of town seven days a week and rarely home. After the child was born, Charles was only home on the weekends. The Joint Accounts were predominantly funded by Charles' earnings. The parties maintained separate accounts as well. As between each other, Charles referred to Erin as his "wife."

Erin and Charles never married. Erin left the Ranch in June

2021 and ended the parties' relationship.

The purchase price for the Ranch was \$385,000. Charles supplied the entirety of the \$77,000 down payment from proceeds from the sale of his Gardnerville home. The balance was financed by a mortgage taken on by both Charles and Erin. \$261,577.82 is still owed. Monthly payments were made from the Joint Accounts until Charles closed the Joint Accounts following separation. Charles has since made the monthly payment with his own money from his separate accounts. The Ranch recently appraised for \$977,000.00.

Erin and Charles were together from 2013 through 2021, approximately eight years. They purchased the Ranch together and purchased personal property from their Joint Accounts. The Court has not been supplied with an inventory of personal property held at the Ranch, but the evidence supports that the parties accumulated A LOT of personal property at the Ranch. Charles maintains that some of the personal property is owned by his separate business, but made no effort at trial to establish what specific property is separately owned. Erin successfully demonstrated that much of the property was purchased with funds from the Joint Accounts.

Erin views the personal property and Joint Accounts as being jointly held. Erin made a choice in the lawsuit to forego any attempt to seek possession or credit for personal property remaining at the Ranch and/or rent from Charles for his sole occupation of the Ranch since separation. Erin acknowledges having possession of a 2015 Chevrolet Truck ("15 Chevy"). Erin also acknowledges having possession of a Bison stock trailer and

the title to a 1999 Chevy that she agrees to return to Charles. Erin also admits having possession a small animal shelter and "some" Uline shelves, valued by Charles at \$600 and \$720 respectively, that she would like to keep.

Conclusions of Law

Partition

Erin seeks partition of the Ranch pursuant to NRS Chapter 39. It is undisputed that Erin and Charles hold title to the Ranch as joint tenants. The parties agree that physically fractioning the Ranch is not practicable or desired. Erin requests sale of the Ranch and equal division of proceeds with appropriate offsets to Charles for his financial contributions. Charles opposes selling the Ranch, claiming 100% ownership based upon his financial contributions.

The primary question presented is whether Erin and Charles, as joint tenants, own the Ranch equally or whether the circumstances indicate equal ownership is inappropriate. Erin and Charles were engaged to be married and chose to take title of the Ranch as joint tenants at a time when Charles, the primary wage earner, was infrequently at home and Erin was left to care for the children and the Ranch. As seen below, this decision has ramifications.

The parties properly cite Sack v. Tomlin, 110 Nev. 204, 871 P.2d 298 (1994), and Langevin v. York, 111 Nev. 1481, 907 P.2d 981 (1995). However, the parties fail to cite Howard v. Hughes, 134 Nev. 664, 427 P.3d 1045 (2018), an on-point case clarifying the standards and presumptions relating to joint tenancies. The Nevada Supreme Court held:

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Under \$ack, cotenants are presumed to equally share property, "unless circumstances indicate otherwise." Sack, 110 Nev. at 213, 871 P.2d at 304. Additionally, the presumption of equal shares may be rebutted through unequal contributions to property by unrelated cotenants who lack donative intent. Id. If successfully rebutted, fractional shares are based on the amount contributed by each party. Id. Langevin purportedly applied the Sack presumptions to joint tenants, but it divided property in proportion to the amount contributed by each partly without clearly rebutting the presumption Langevin, 111 Nev. at 1485-86, 907 of equal ownership. We take this opportunity to clarify that P.2d at 984. the presumptions from Sack concerning tenants in common apply to joint tenants.

Howard, 134 Nev. at 664. "Accordingly, under Sack, it is presumed tenants in common own property equally, unless successfully rebutted through lack of familial relationship or lack of donative intent, and if successfully rebutted, ownership interest is based on the amount contributed by each party." Id. at 667 (internal citation omitted) The same applies to joint tenants. Further,

"Determining a donor's donative intent and beliefs is a question of fact for the fact-finder.... In Nevada, a valid...donative transfer requires a donor's intent to voluntarily make a present transfer of property to a donee without consideration, the donor's actual or constructive delivery of the gift to the donee, and the donee's acceptance of the gift. Further, where an individual obtains possession of property pursuant to a written agreement establishing a joint tenancy, the law generally presumes that such agreement is conclusive, and a donative intent is presumed....

Howard at 668 (internal quotations and citations omitted).

Here, Erin and Charles are joint tenants by way of written title. The law presumes Erin and Charles share the property equally. The evidence clearly and convincingly establishes donative intent. Specifically, Charles did not transfer the

Ranch to Erin. Erin and Charles shopped for and purchased the 1 Ranch together, taking written title as joint tenants and becoming 2 3 jointly indebted. The purchase took place when the parties were engaged to be married. This is distinguished from the 5 circumstance where a couple chooses to remain unmarried to preserved financial independence or otherwise. Charles intended 6 7 to "share" the home with Erin. The evidence conflicts regarding the parties' expectations regarding the roles each were to play in 8 contributing to the Ranch, whether financially or through service. 9 However, it is undisputed that Charles was rarely at home and was 10 the sole financial provider. It is also undisputed that the 11 remote 26-acre Ranch had no formal employees and Erin was left 12 home alone to care for the children, cattle, goats, chickens, 13 pigs, nursery, hemp, alfalfa, etc. Shortly after the parties 14 purchased the Ranch, Erin became aware that she was pregnant and 15 Charles added Erin to three financial accounts to ensure Erin's 16 financial well-being during his absences. Erin quit being a nanny 17 18 to take care of the children and the Ranch. In accord, the 19 evidence establishes Erin's donative intent in quitting her job and moving to Wellington to care for the home and the children and 20 21 Charles' donative intent in contributing financially. 22 hindsight regret over taking title as joint tenants does not change the assessment. See, Weeks v. Weeks, 72 Nev. 268, 274 302 23 P.2d 750 (1956) (A choice of tenancy must be made, and we may 24 assume that it will sometimes be made inadvisedly or that later 25 26 developments may indicate that the choice seemingly advantageous 27 at the time, has resulted in loss or hardship).

Based upon the foregoing, Erin and Charles equally own the

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Ranch. Charles opines that Erin's request for partition and sale of the Ranch is vindictive. The Court does not assess Erin's motive because her motive is not relevant. As a joint tenant, Erin has a right to seek partition. The Ranch must be sold. Erin offers to reimburse Charles \$77,000.00 (down payment), \$17,613.18 (principal reduction) and \$8,366.91 (taxes and insurance). Additionally, Erin does not seek back-rent from Charles for his sole use and occupation of the Ranch post-separation.

The Court points out that even in the absence of donative intent, Charles would not be entitled to 100% ownership of the Charles has not paid 100% of the purchase price as only \$123,423 of the \$385,000 purchase price has been paid. Even if Charles paid all ϕf the \$123,423 (32%) from his separate funds, which is disputed, \$261,577.82 (68%) remains unpaid. percentage of ownership allocable to each party would be determined in accordance with the contribution of each party at the time the property is sold or when all the payments are made. Langevin, 111 Nev. at 1485 (reference Parcel C). The value of Erin's services to date has not been proven and it is unknown what Erin would have contributed financially and/or through her services, if the parties had remained together (Charles testified that he expected Erin to contribute more financially over time). Further, Charles would owe back rent to Erin as he has had sole use and occupancy of the Ranch since 2021. Additionally, the Ranch is now valued at \$977,000.00 and there is no evidence that the significant appreciation is due solely to Charles' efforts and contributions. Under these circumstances, Charles would not be entitled to an outright award the Ranch even if the secondary

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presumption were rebutted.

Conversion

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Charles main tains that when Erin left, she took "her" personal property and converted some of "his" personal property and funds from the Joint Accounts. "Conversion is a distinct act of dominion over another's personal property in denial of, or inconsistent with his title or rights therein or in derogation, exclusion, or defiance of such title or rights. Further, conversion is an act of general intent, which does not require wrongful intent and is not excused by care, good faith, or lack of knowledge. Whether conversion has occurred is generally a question of fact []." Evans v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 116 Nev. 598, 606, 5 P.3d 1043 (2000) (internal quotations and citations omitted).

Charles has the burden of proving conversion. This involves establishing an ownership interest in specific items of personal property and that Erin is responsible for Charles' loss of said property. Accept as otherwise held below, Charles did not provide sufficient evidence of what specific personal property was removed from the Ranch and/or that Erin is responsible for the loss. Charles generically asserts that all personal property purchased with funds from the Joint Accounts is "his" because he alone contributed the funds to the Joint Accounts. The Court disagrees that it is this simple, particularly as it relates to the use of Joint Accounts funds to purchase jointly titled property. Additionally, it has already been established that the Joint Accounts were created with donative intent. Except as otherwise provided below, Charles failed to prove the personal property is

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"his" as opposed to being jointly owned by him and Erin. Accordingly, at the very most Charles is entitled to 50% of the value, similar to the real property partition.

1. Funds Removed from Joint Accounts

Erin withdrew \$46,542.16 from the parties' Joint Accounts in May-June 2021. Erin left the Ranch and separated from Charles in July 2021. Charles argues the withdrawals constitute conversion based upon proof that he was the sole contributor of funds in the Joint Accounts. Charles claims entitlement to the entire amount withdrawn or at least one-half.

As already held, Charles acted with donative intent when he established and funded the Joint Accounts. Charles funded the accounts so that his intended and pregnant wife would have the funds available for withdrawal at anytime without his permission. While Charles continued to maintain other separate accounts, his paychecks went into the Joint Accounts. Erin made other withdrawals from the Joint Accounts during the parties' relationship without complaint from Charles.

The Joint Accounts and the proceeds from the Joint Accounts are owned by Charles and Erin and "may be paid or delivered to any of them during the lifetime of all...." NRS 100.085. As equal owner of the Joint Accounts, Erin's withdrawal of funds in May-June 2021 does not constitute conversion anymore so than the prior withdrawals made by Erin or Charles. Charles' hindsight testimony that he put Erin on the accounts "because I am an idiot" does not change the equation. Charles is not entitled to reimbursement under a theory of conversion and has not posed an alternative basis for relief. | Notably, Charles received some relief by way

of this Court's June 24, 2022 Findings of Facts, Conclusions of Law and Decree Establishing Child Custody and Support, p. 14, as it relates to child support arrears.

2. 2015 Chevrolet Truck

Erin and Charles purchased a 2015 Chevrolet truck ("15 Chevy") in 2016, taking title as Erin or Charles. The 15 Chevy was paid for, at least in part, with funds from the Joint Accounts. Erin has sole possession of the 15 Chevy and changed title to her name alone. Frin converted the 15 Chevy by keeping it from joint owner Charles and changing the title. Erin estimates the 15 Chevy has a value of \$20,000.

3. Proceeds from Sale of a Harley Davidson.

It is undisputed that Charles owned a Harley Davidson before he met Erin. The Harley Davidson was never jointly titled. At Charles' request, Erin sold the Harley Davidson for \$2,000 cash and placed the proceeds in a safe at the Ranch. The safe was accessible by Charles and Erin. The money is missing. Erin testified as to her belief that she had permission to take money from the safe.

Charles contends that Erin converted the money. The Court agrees. Just because Erin had access to the safe does not mean that she was at liberty to take the Harley Davidson proceeds. Erin converted the \$2,000.00.

4. Cattle

Charles maintains that when he returned to the Ranch after
Erin left in July 2021, 20 head of cattle were missing and have
not been returned. Given the timing, Charles blames Erin for the
loss. Charles did not produce any proof of ownership or offer

any additional evidence pointing to Erin other than an objected to and inadmissible hearsay statement from a brand inspector.

Charles did not call the brand inspector as a witness or provide any other proof. Charles failed to prove Erin converted the cattle.

5. Other personal property

Erin argues that Charles provided absolutely no evidence that she took personal property from the Ranch. The Court disagrees. Charles testified that when he returned to the Ranch after Erin left in July 2021, he discovered voluminous amounts of personal property missing, including Erin's personal property. In addition to the aforementioned 20 head of cattle, property missing included 500 gallons of gasoline, clamps, water totes, greenhouse lights, bevellers, a welding machine, a welding trailer, jacks, approximately 70 livestock fence panels, generators, a livestock scale, a pump, tires, drying racks, etc.

Given the timing, Charles attributes the loss to Erin.

Charles' suspicion is corroborated by the testimony of a neighbor who on two occasions observed a man and a woman (not Erin) removing items from the Ranch. The only specific property recalled by the neighbor, however, was some fence panels. Charles testified to having a belief that the man and woman were associated with Erin. Charles tracked the man and woman to their residence where he observed some of the Ranch's missing property on a trailer such as some fence panels, a child's quad, water totes and pipe. Charles did not subpoena the man and woman or offer any other supporting evidence such as photographs.

From the evidence, there is no reason to question Charles'

credibility as to his observations upon return to the Ranch. The timing of the loss of personal property in relation to Erin taking \$45,000 out of the Joint Accounts and vacating the Ranch, when coupled with the neighbor's testimony, is circumstantial evidence that Erin is responsible for the loss. However, that does not end the analysis.

The 26-acre Ranch contained loads of un-inventoried property scattered about the garage, storage containers, a semi-trailer, a travel trailer, trailers, vehicles, the ground, the corrals, etc. Property that might be properly attributed to Charles' welding or cattle business was commingled with Charles and Erin's personal The volume of the un-inventoried property detracts property. significantly from Charles' case. For instance, Charles testified that he had "thousands" of drying trays at the Ranch, of which he offers pure speculation that Erin took twenty. Charles presented no proof of purchase for the thousands of trays and did not trace their purchase from anything other than the parties' Joint Accounts. Charles wants to be reimbursed from Erin for the 20 trays he speculates she took while giving her no credit for the thousands of trays that he maintains. This same issue is repeated as to Charles' claim of conversion of other property such as fence panels, food-grade storage containers (Charles testified he owned "roughly 50"), jadks, clamps, shelves, grow lights, etc.

Erin may have taken personal property from the Ranch. However, Charles failed to prove what exactly Erin took. Given the volume and nature of the property allegedly taken, the Court would have expected Charles to present additional evidence. Just as if the cattle could have been traced through the likes of a

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brand inspector and the man and woman seen removing personal property could have been subpoensed, so too there could have been more effort to prove and track 500 gallons of fuel, 70 fence panels, etc. Indeed, Charles made only vague inquiry of Erin during her testimony and did not follow up on Erin's general denials. Except as otherwise held, Charles failed to prove conversion.

Other

1. Attorney's Fees and Costs

The costs of an action for partition must be paid by the parties in proportion to their respective interests and said costs may be included in the judgment. NRS 39.480. Here, the parties have equal interest in the Ranch. The costs of partition will be taken from the proceeds of the sale of the Ranch prior to distribution.

The Court has discretion to order payment of "reasonable counsel fees expended by the parties for the common benefit" in proportion to the parties' respective interests in the Ranch. NRS 39.480. Here, Erin and Charles each engaged independent counsel, not for the common benefit. Neither party cites any other authority authorizing an award of attorney's fees. In an exercise of the Court's discretion, each party shall be responsible for their own attorney's fees as it relates to the actions for partition and conversion.

This Court previously awarded Charles "\$5,787.57 as reasonable attorney's fees and costs in defending against Erin's Motion for Order to Enforce and Hold in Contempt." April 4, 2023, Order Awarding Petitioner Attorney's Fees and Costs, p. 4. Erin

Id. Erin has not paid.

2. Expert Fees

On March 15, 2022, Erin and Charles stipulated to engage Dr. Joseph McEllistrem to conduct psychological evaluation of their child. Stipulation Regarding Psychological Evaluation. The parties agreed to "equally share the cost of the preparation of the evaluation. Charlie shall pay the entire amount to Dr. McEllistrem. Erin shall reimburse Charlie her one-half through a credit in the final disposition of property a[s] the time of trial." Id. The stipulation was granted on March 21, 2022.

was ordered to pay the sum in full within 45 days of the order.

Charles designated Dr. McEllistrem as an expert witness for the custody trial. Designation of Expert Witness, April 20, 2022.

Erin too designated Dr. McEllistrem as an expert witness for the custody trial. Designation of Expert Witnesses, May 16, 2022.

As commissioned by Erin and Charles, Dr. McEllistrem conducted the evaluation and his 35-page report was admitted during the custody trial. In addition, Dr. McEllistrem testified at the trial. The Court noted, "Dr. McEllistrem is a neutral expert jointly hired by Erin and Charles." Findings of Facts, Conclusions of Law and Decree Establishing Child Custody and Support, p. 9.

Charles paid the entirety of Dr. McEllistrem's bill, \$9,000.00 for the evaluation/report and \$1,750 for testimony.

Pursuant to the stipulation, Charles requests a credit of \$5,375.00 as against Erin's portion of the Ranch sales proceeds.

Erin agrees to pay \$4,500.00, her share of for evaluation

and report, but disagrees with paying for one half of Dr. McEllistrem's testimony (\$875.00).

While the stipulation referred only to Dr. McEllistrem's evaluation and report, Erin and Charlie both designated Dr.

McEllistrem as a trial witness. Further, the report was introduced at trial and considered by the Court. As already found by the Court, Dr. McEllistrem was a neutral witness jointly retained by the parties. The Court finds is appropriate to credit Charles \$5,375.00 from Erin's portion of the Ranch proceeds based upon the parties' stipulation.

Judgment

- 1. 15 Chevy Erin shall immediately sign over title to the 15 Chevy to Charles and deliver to Charles the title and related documents, all keys, the 15 Chevy (in good working condition) and all implements/attachments such as lift kits and camper shells.
- 2. Bison Stock Trailer. Erin shall immediately deliver the Bison stock trailer to Charles (in good working condition), all implements/attachments and any associated documentation including title.
- 3. Title to 1999 Chevy. Erin shall immediately sign over to Charles the title to the 1999 Chevy and deliver the same to Charles.
- 4. Title to Grizzly Quad, Polaris Quad, Eco Trailer. Erin shall immediately search for documentation and titles for the Grizzly quad, Polaris quad and Eco trailer and deliver any such recovered documents to Charles as soon as possible.
- 5. All other disputed personal property is set aside to the party currently possession.

THOMAS W. GREGORY DISTRICT JUDGE NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT P.O. BOX 218 MINDEN, NV 89423

- 7. Proceeds from the sale of the Ranch will be used to pay the mortgage and all costs associated with the sale, including closing costs and agent fees. Counsel shall insure that remaining proceeds be deposited into a trust account for distribution to the parties.
- 8. Remaining proceeds from the sale of the Ranch shall be distributed equally to the parties with the following offsets due to Charles:

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$ 77,000.00 (down payment)
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\$ 17,613.18 (principal reduction)

\$ 8,366.91 (taxes and insurance)

\$ 5,787.57 (attorney's fees as sanction)

\$ 5,375.00 (reimbursement for Dr. McEllistrem)

\$ 2,000.00 (Harley Davidson proceeds)

\$ TBD (mortgage, insurance, taxes paid from date of Judgment until sale)

LESS \$ 10,000.00 (1/2 the value of the 15 Chevy)

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1	9. Attorney's Fees. Each party shall bear their own
2	attorney's fees as to the partition and conversion actions.
3	IT IS SO ORDERED.
4	DATED this 3th day of April 2024.
5	1.118
6	THOMAS W. CREGORY
7	DISTRICT JUDGE
8	Copies served by mail/messenger on April 81 2024, addressed to
9	Neal C. Falk, Esq. Jennifer S. Anderson, Esq.
10	1664 US Highway 395 N, Ste 105
11	Minden, Nevada 89423 Carson City, Nevada 89703
	(U.S. Mail) (Messenger)
12	
13	Eun c. Piente.
14	Erin C. Plante
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23	CERTIFIED COPY
24	The document to which this certificate is attached is a full, true and correct copy of the original in file and of record in my office.
25	DATE 04.26.2024.
26	BOBBIE R. WILLIAMS Clerk of Count of the State of Nevada, in and for the County of Douglas,
27	By Y. Weidne Deputy
28	
THOMAS W. GREGORY DISTRICT JUDGE NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT P.O. BOX 218 MINDEN, NV 89423	17